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PE 78.127/fin.The proposals for resolution listed below were referred by Parliament to
the Political Affairs Committee:
on 14 October 1981, the motion for a resolution tabled by Mr IS~AEL on the
situation in Poland (Doc. 1-591/81)
on 16 December 1981, the motion for a resolution tabled by Mr ROMUALDI and
others on the state of emergency in Poland (Doc. 1-891/81)
on 17 February 1982, the motion for a resolution tabled by Mrs MACCIOCCHI
on the situation in Poland ~ Doc. 1-1035/81).
on 14 June 1982, the motion for a resolution tabled by Mr GAWRONSKI on
aid for Poland (Doc. 1- ' 0/82)
The Committee on Budgets was asked for its opinion on this last motion
for a resolution.
At its meeting of 27 and 28 October 1981, the Political Affairs Committee
decided to draw up a report on the situation in Poland.
On 28 January 1982, Mr DESCHAMPS was appointed rapporteur.
The Political Affairs Committee considered the present report at
its meetings on 24 ~ 26 February 1982, 28 - 30 April 1982 and 23 - 25 June 1982.
At this last meeting it adopted the motion for a resolution which follows by
16 votes to 7.
The following took part in the vote: Mr Rumor, chairman; Mr Deschamps,
rapporteur; Mr Baillot, Mr Cariglia, Mr Croux (deputizing for Mr Schall),
Lord Douro, Mr Fellermaier (deputizing for Mr Brandt), Mr Fergusson,
Mr B. Friedrich, Mr Gawronski (deputizing for Mr Bettiza), Mr Habsburg,
Mr H~nsch, Mr Herman (deputizing for Mr von Hassel), Mr Israel (deputizing
for Mr de la Malene), Mr Katzer (deputizing for Mr Klepsch), Mrs Lenz,
Mr Mommersteeg (deputizing forMr Antoniozzi), Mr. Moorhouse (deputizing for
Lady Elles), Mr Penders, Mr prag (deputizing for Lord Bethell), Sir James
Scott-Hopkins, Mr Seefeld (deputizing for Mr Schieler), Mr Walter (deputizing
for Mr Motchane), Mr Wedekind (deputizing for Mr Barbi).
The opinion of the Committee on Budgets will be published separately
or delivered orally in the House.
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- 4 - PE 78. 127/fin.The Political Affairs Committee hereby submits to the European Parliament
the following motion for a resolution, together with explanatory statement
MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION
on the situation in Poland
The European Parliament,
recalling its resolutions
- of 9 April 1975 , of 11 May 1977 , of 10 May 1978 3 and of 15 October
19804 on security and cooperation in Europe,
- of 18 September 1980 on human rights in Poland
December 1981 the situation Poland
December 1981 the refugees from Poland 7
- of 21 January 1982 on declaring a day of solidarity with the Polish
people on 30 January 1982
having regard to the motion for a resolution tabled by Mr ISRAEL on the
situation in Poland (Doc. 1-591/81),
- the motion for a resolution tabled by Mr ROMUALDI and others on the
state of emergency in Poland (Doc. 1-891/81),
- the motion for a resolution tabled by Mrs MACCIOCCHI on the situation
in Poland (Doc. 1-1035/81),
- the motion for a resolution tabled by Mr GAWRONSKI on aid for Poland
(Doc. 1-310/82),
hovine) reqard If) 1- 11(' report of Ille l'oJiUc, 1I /\Ct, IS l'ommitt0.l!
(Doc. 1-436/82),
As regards the CSE
A.  in the awareness, as the democratic Assembly representing the conscience
of the people of Europe, of its role as the defender of basic freedoms
wherever they are threatened and regardless of the geographical situation
of or the political system in the countries concerned,
B. in the awareness that the crisis in Poland is an expression of the growing
difficulties of the Communist system in Eastern Europe that will burden
East-West relations and weigh heavily on the policy of security and

















- 5 - PE 78. 127/fin.C. whereas the repressive measures taken by the Polish leadership under pressure
from and with the support of the Soviet Union constitute an infringement of
human rights and of the Final Act of the CSCE signed in Helsinki in July 1975,
D. in the conviction that the Polish tragedy can not be removed from the context
of the Helsinki Pinal Act and that in signing those agreements, the European
Community entered into formal commitments in the matter of compliance with
human rights (by all signatories),
E.. whereas the military take-over on 12-13 December 1981 and the introduction of
martial law are not simply an internal Polish problem, the specific responsib-
ility of the USSR in those events calling for a clear, firm and strong
response,
F. whereas liberties in Poland have, to  an  increasing extent, been wilfully
suppressed, requiring specific measures to persuade the military junta to
loosen its hold on the country,
Condemns the proclamation of martial law in Poland and the situation it
has produced as a threat to cooperation and security between peoples;
Considers that a return to the spirit of Helsinki on the part of all
signatories is an essential part of detente;
Recalls that detente is incompatible with the idea that there are ' spheres
of influence I in the world in which infringements of the basic principles
of Helsinki are justifiable and where other rules apply;
Recalls the more fundamental point that detente, as manifested in the whole
range of mutual commitments of which it  consists, lS indivisible;
Declares that in its view, any distinction between political, military,
humanitarian and economic and commercial detente is unacceptable; and since
the various aspects of detente cannot be pursued in isolation or out of
step, failure to respect human rights and fundamental freedoms affects
economic cooperation,
Stresses, nevertheless, that the primary aim of the policy of the Ten
remains that of helping the Polish people along the path of democratic
renewal;
II. As regards the USSR
A. having regard to the specific responsibility of the USSR in the present
situation i~ Poland;
B. noting that through direct interference and covert intervention, the USSR
(a) for .a period of 18 months systematically pursued a policy designed to
threaten and pressurize Poland, a country in the process of democratic
renewal:
- 6 - PE 78.127/fin.intimidatory military exercises at its borders and even on Polish
soil,
- the official declaration by the Central Committee of the Soviet
Communist Party demanding that I the course of events be turned back'
- the press campaign against the freedom movement begun in Poland,
(b) gave active political support to the decision to tak~i'i:md
the implementation of the measures that were introduced on 13 December
1981,
Takes note of the decisions to restrict certain imports from the USSR
taken by the Council of the Community on 15 March 1982 after the Member
States had jointly acknowledged the responsibility of the USSR for what
had happened in Poland;
Demands that the interest rates on credit granted by EEC Member States
to the USSR be brought into line with those on credit granted to other
industrialized countries;
Should the present situation in Poland persist, demands a fundamental
reassessment of the EEC' s entire economic policy towards the USSR;
III.  As regards Poland
Noting that:
A. the process of renewal in Poland had been underway for 18 months without
call for or resort to violence (on the part of the free trade union
movements, notably Solidarity),
B. but the continuation of martial law may well create an explosive situation,
c. in effect, the continuation of martial law brings with it further cases of
infringement of the most basic human rights and the rights of citizens,
D. continuation of martial law also hinders economic revival.
Expresses its indignation that:
10. The militia continues to intern people for the opinions they hold;
11. The spec ial courts set up under mart ial law render summary justice;
12. The number of cases of arbi trary dismissal is increasing;
13. The ' declarations of loyalty ' which orrlClaLS, magistrates, journalists,
teachers and those engaged in scientific research are required to make
are  violation of conscience~
~ 7 - PE 78. 127/fin.14. The disbandment of the Union of Polish Journalists and its replacement
by an officially appointed body simply represents a take-over of the
media: press, radio, TV;
15. The campaigns in the press, radio and television, now in the hands
of or subject to the military, to discredit the leaders of Solidarity are
growing louder;
16. It is also the' cont~nuat~on ot  mart~al law that allows the military
junta in power to step up its attempts to break the solidarity of the
Polish people and, more especially, the solidarity between workers and
intellectuals, through discriminatory measures, assignment to different
camps and the imposition of different conditions of internment;
IV. Martial law
p..
whereas it is impossible to accept this growing oppression
B. whereas the numbers of detainees released are insufficient,
17 ~a) wishes first to express its respect for the courage shown by those in
Poland who continue to fight for the preservation of liberty;
(b) pays special tribute to the determination shown by Lech Walesa and the
leaders of Solidarity who are either interned or operating in clandest-
inity;
18. RecaLLS the urgent appeal it made in Strasbourg on 17 December 1981 for (a) the repeal of marti-al law,
(b) the immediate' release of prisoners,
the resumption of the dialogue between the representatives of the
Polish people (gove~nment, church, Solidarity);
Insists on t : i' llowing 'demands in particular:
19. Internees must be released and they and their dependants should receive
compensation;
20. The trade union law being drafted by the Polish Diet should not only
enshrine the established fact of trade union pluralism but also effectively
restore the right to a trade union that has already been created and made
legal;
21. The right of association must be restoreCl in,all sections of the population,
particularly in the case of young people who are wholly excluded from public
life outside the ruling party;
22. Freedom of information must be ensured by allowing foreign journalists to
enter, freely travel and freely report in Poland and by reinstating the
union of Polish journalists;
- 8 - PE 78.l27/fin.Economic aid
whereas the resumption or extension of  political and economic relations with
Poland must be made contingent on the extent of the change in the present
situation,
23. Hopes that the West will be ready to grant substantial economic and financial
aid to Poland if a decisive change takes place in which the processes of
democratic renewal begun in August 1980 are resumed;
24. Recommends that the political and economic authorities of the West adjust
their decisions on economic and financial cooperation with Poland in the
light of developments in the internal situation of the country;
25. Demands that, notwithstanding the measures Teferred to in Section II and
in paragraphs 8 and 9 in particular, no new offers of credit and aid in
any form whatsoever be made for the time being - with the exception of
food aid sent through charitable organizations;
VI. Humani tarian aid
whereas it is necessary to step up humanitarian aid to the Polish people,
B.  whereas, regardless of the situation, solidarity with the Polish people
implies that food aid and humanitarian aid should continue,
26. Approves the measures taken by the Council of the Community on
23 February 1982 to continue providing direct humanitarian aid;
27. Advocates support for all forms of private aid to Poland and, more
specif ically, that the transport costs of aid organized by private
individuals should be charged to the appropriate items of the Community
budget;
28. Calls on the governments of Member States which have not yet done so
to facilitate the sending of gift parcels by private individuals, by
assuming direct responsibility themselves for the postal charges
involved;
C.  whereas it is necessary to arrange also for humanitarian aid to Polish
refugees,
29. Reminds the Council of the Community 9f its commitment to look into
what can be done to ease the situation of Polish nationals outside
Poland who do not wish to return in the present circumstances;
30. Calls on the Communi ty Member States to join the non-European countries
that take immigrants in accepting the tens of thousands of Polish refugees
who are still living in refugee camps in Austria;
- 9 - PE 78. 127/fin.31. specifically requests that long-term visas be granted to those Polish
nationals in the Member States who wish to postpone their return to
poland without applying for political , asylum;
32. Calls for continued assistance to Polish students and graduates for
studies at universities in the west;
33. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Ministers of
Foreign Affairs of the Community Member States meeting in political
cooperation and to the Council and the Commission.
- 10 - PE 78. 127/fin.EXPLANATORY STATEMEN'f
INTRODUCTION
The Political Affairs Committee decided to draw up the present
report on the situation in Poland: after Parliament had voted a
number of separate resolutions ' in connection with major developments
in poland, and particularly the proclamation of the state of siege on
13 December 1981, it was felt necessary to examine the factors which
allowed such a situation to arise and to try to assess how it is likely
to evolve in the future.
Such an analysis is the aim and the subject of the present
explanatory statement. The practical conclusions drawn from this
analysis are presented in the form of a resolution.
be isolated from the
flagrant violation.
cannot reg~rd the proclamation of the state of
its consequenCes as that country s internal affairs.
be considered outside the wider context of East-
the policy of detente, and least of all can they
Helsinki Final Act, of which they constitute a
Our Parliament
siege in Poland and
These events cannot
West relations or of
The political, social and economic divide between East and West,
due above all to the misinterpretation of the Yalta and Helsinki
agreements by the USSR, creates a st2.te of permanent tension which
the peoples inhabiting Central Europe have to endure.
But, more than ten years ago, the era of confrontation gave way
to that of detente. The Helsjnki Final Act of 1973 was to confer
legal status on the  de facto state of detente at the same time as it
asserted the fundamental rights of the peoples of Europe.
Within the last two years, however, the policy of detente has
suffered the gravest set-backs 1 for which the Soviet intervention in
AfghanistaD. and the recent events in Poland are directly responsible 
(Declaration of the Franco-German Summit of 25 February 1982).
More specifically, severi1l months after the military ' coup ' and
the coming to power of the junta, the situation in Poland, as the
Conclusions of the European Council of 29~30 March 1982 stated, continues
to weigh heavily an East-West relations and to affect the relations of
the Ten with Poland and with the USSR, which country bears an undoubted
responsibility for this state of affairs.
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of the policy of detente - firmness with moderation, remain valid.
We must not respond to these reverses by a return to the cold  war
or by opting  for  confrontation, That would be a dangerous and sterile
reaction. It would mean the renunciation of all active policy. The
response should, on the C"ontri\ry, consist in a policy in which firmness
in defence of our interests and ideitls goes hand in hand wi th the
encouragement of a policy of moderation and a permanent offer of
mutually advantageous cooperation .
It is in tile latter spirit that this explanatory statement and
motion for a re~olution deal both with the problem of measures vis-i-vis
the USSR and that of conditional economic aid  for  Poland.
It is in tllis spirit too, that after a brief summary of the
. changed course ' of Polish history after 13 December 1981, an analysis
is undertaken of the fundamental constituents of Polish society (the
Church - Solidarity - Youth) and the rolet they should play in the
search  for  a . national reconci liation ' that will aafeguard the freedoms
that have been regained.
SOCIALIST POLAND:
SECTION I
POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC BACKGROUND
CHAPTER I : YALTA AND SOVIET DOMINATION
:~!:~~!.~ !!29' - 2Y ~ _2& _
!~!!:~ -
m~~m! - e!:~~~1!29' - 2~!: -  2! - !:h~ _! ~!!:~ - ~~!:h .
(3. Laloy)
When the last two years ' events in Poland are discussed, reference
is often made to the Conference at which the Soviet Union, the United
States and the United Kingdom met in the Crimea from 4 to 11 February
1945. And it is true that it is impossible to obtain a true appreciation
of the present situation, search  for:  its fundamental causes, or try to
forecast its future development, without referring to the Yalta Agree-
ments. But it is important to know exactly what they comprise and to
avoid misinterpredtlons.
1 P. CORTENIER, Minister of State for Foreign Affairs of the FRG:
lecture at the Institut fran~ais de relations internationales,
Paris, on 16 February 1982
PE 78. 127/fin.
- 12 -It is an over-simpLification to present the Yalta Agreements as
a sharing-out of Europe and the world between the United States and
the USSR, a binding and definitive division that nothing ,,'end no-one
Can challenge today without taking the responsibility 
for  jeopardizing
Peace. Certainly no written document, no evidence. no record exists
to support that myth. Actually, the reality behind the Yalta Agreements
was not a carve-up but. rather a rccognH:ion of fa.cts. And, incidentally,
what the Soviet system is s'cr iviog for is not to divide Europe into
two blocs but to obtain dominant and sovereign influence over the whole
of Europe by cl~iming a right of intervention here, a right of over-
sight there.
In February 1945, Poland with the whole of Eastern Europe, except
for  a large part of Czechos lovak i a, was held by the Red Army. It was
thus not u question of what 13riti':i.i.n and America would allow Russi!;). to 
in Poland, but. ,..;hat the United Kingdom and the United States could
pursuade the Soviet Union to accept with regard to that country.
13 . !h~ _
! ~! ~~ _
~~f~~~~D ~ - 2n - ~21 ~Q9
A special chapter of the Agreements was devoted to Poland and it
laid down:
L its provisional terr itod a 1 status (the Curzon Lin0 to the east,
Hllbstantial ter;:itor.i.o_ gain!'; to th... north and west); the final
out! ine ,)f the W0.stcrn r nH1l ie-r would not be detc,rmi r'le-d unt 11 the
P(;'.o.lC~~ Conference,
2, the form of the future qovcrmncnt, to be set up on a democratic
basis a,nd to be representative of the Poles in Poland and abroad;
5, the obligation. of this ' provisional Polish Government of national
ututy ' to hold free and unconstrained elections on the basis of
universal suffrage and a secr0t ballot.
The United States demanded Lhat the elections be held under
international supervision, but this was rejected by Molotov on the
pretext that ' 1 t might be of fensi  ve  to ,the ,poles , as it implied that
they W~I e subject to the control of foreign diplomatic representatives.
Bo\.h Roosevelt and Churchill stressed that one thing was certain 
the Poles should have a rclat iOiU;hip of the closest friendship with the
USSH baaed  011  a genuine desire for eoopcration. but within the frilme"oJork
PE 78. 127/fin.
- 13 -of a truly democratic system. ChurchillJ in partic~lar, insisted
vigorously that he  ":las  more interested in . Poland" s sovereign'
and independence \ than in the question of the frontiers. He wanted
Poland to he ' mistress of herself and captain of her soul'
(B. Stettiniue, ' Yalta , P&ris 1951, p. 151). To Stalin, on the
other hand, the Polish question was ' a strategic question of security
The USSR, he s~id, wanted a strong independent and democratic Poland
which .could help to protect the Soviet Union. To this end he wanted
to establish a  security ring ' of countries on its borders.
Yaltal not a conspiracy but a misconstruction
-------- -------- ---- - --- ---- - ---- -  -------- ---
i"o!~ the Soviets, Poland waf! to become, first and foremost, a
secur:i,t)' buffer that could be relied on both militarily ant;1 ideologically.
The Aroer icans and the Brl  ti  sh, who readily accepted that the Polish
Gove:cnmEmt must not be hostile or unfriendly towards the Soviet Union,
did not ' regard this as: conflicting ""ith the requirement that the
government should be democratic, r'epresentative of the whole nation,
sovereign and
The misunderstanding  deliberately engineered by the Soviets
from the outset and thereafter maintained by them and by those pre-
pared to govez'n Poland on their behalf, remains at the root of the
present drama. On the Soviet side, Poland' s membership of the eastern
mil5.ta, r:y (3.11ia11(;e and of the .soviet system is regarded as irreversible.
1/)cstern dernocraots, while they do not challenge the allegiance of Poland
and other Ea8tern European countries to the Warsaw Pact, do not See
this as precluding an internal evolution of the system of government.
At the time of the Yalta meeting. the Russians were in a position
to dominate Sov'iet influence 'Mould reach as far as Soviet
2nns could p8net:rate" rh(' on 1y choice before Rooseve It and Churchill
wag Detwecn war and compromise. Once the alternative was posed in those tenns ic and straleqic facts automatically tipped the




A continuous presence of Soviet forces in Poland since 1944, an
agreement on mutual friendship and economic cooperation with the USSR
concluded in 1045 and renewed in 1965 - these are the crucial elements
of tl,e sit. \)f.  :,-J')  in Poland Itlhic:h ,vas now t,o remain under the dominant
- 14 - FE 78.127/fin.influence of the Soviet Union. Poland, a nation renowned for its
deep love of freedom, was from 1945 onwards deprived of freedom to
choose either its government or its destiny.
A people f s referendum in 1946 confirmed the structural economic
changes in Poland, but the first elections to the Diet did not take
place until the beginning of 1947. The opposition got 38 seats out
of 432. There was no international supervision. It was the last
occasion when a legally recognized opposition was allowed to manifest
itself before it was suppressed by the r~gime.
In 1952 a Constitution was voted making the Polish State a
people s demtlcracy where the power belong'S to the workers of the
towns and the countryside As for civic freedoms, while the letter
of the Constitution and the law guaranteed all the freedoms of a
democratic system and adhered to the Universal Declaration of the
Rights of Man, regulatory practiCe restricted human rights to ensure
security of the regime and the established order.
When  in 1976, the 1952 Constitution was reformed, two essential
points of the Soviet interpretation of the Yalta Agreements were
confirmed:
1. the Polish United Work~rs ' Party (PUWP) became ' the political force
leading the nation in the construction of Socialism
20 friendship and cooperation liJith the USSR, as well as peaceful co-
existence with states possessing a different social system, were
raised to the status of fundamental principles.
This was a decisive turning point and clear-thinking Poles knew
it" But, despite the protests of the intellectuals (the ' Letter of
the 59' ) And vigorous criticism by the Primate of Polandg Cardinal
Wyszynski, the new Constitution was adopted by the Diet in February 1976.
Frtlm that moment onwards, scope for the Polish regime to evolve,
whether to meet the needs of economic development or to satisfy the
social, cultural and spiritual aspirations of the people, became
considerably reduced.
Any at tempt by the Polish ndt~on to free itself of the constraints
of fA rigid 
,..
'c;1  inefficient system would now be thwarted, domestically,
by r:estxictiv~ juridical and consl..itutional interpretations and meet
- 15 - PE 78. 127 /fin.wi  th Moscow s q,ccusations of ' disrupting the established military
balance' from outside. Any such movement, therefore, would be
brutally repressed by the hardliners at home and provoke threats
from ' our great allies ' in the Socialist. camp.
On 23 .June 198.1. ~ published a reminder of this coincidence
of Socialism' s military and ideologica.1. frontiers. The Soviet paper
claimed th,lt imp('riali(~l circles wcU:P. trying to Use the ' Polish
breach' to change the status quo in Europe. It accused the impp'Y"ialists
of 'preparing long-term plans to weaken the Polish link in the Socialist
community
' . 
Their aim. wrote Pravda. was to ' upset the established
pattern of power in Europe and launch an offensive against the post-
war order But, added the paper, ' the principle of the inviolability,
of frontiers has become the cornerstone of security in Europe
CHAPTER II : THE SOVIET SYSTEM AND THE POLISH MODEL
!h~ - :~~~!~m~ _! U_
! ~~ - 
grtb299~- f9fill
Since Yalta  and especially since the 25th CPSU Congress held in
1976, the sovi~t Union has been busy unifying the Socialist countries
of Easti".rn Europe by integrating them increasingly within a common
system of which the Warsaw Pact. and COMECON are the t't"O pillars. Each
Socialist state must totally accept the ' rules of the game ' which the
USSR laid down many years ago for the Socialist system as a whol~. One
of the basic rules is joint. r(~sponsibilily for upholding the ' sY$tem
within each country.
Poland did not and could not enj oy any special status in that
respect and would not be /?Allowed to distance itself in any way from
the ' community'
It is fully subject to the principle of progressive integration in
the Soviet Socialist model. The Soviet, leaders have, indeed, constantly
stressed that Poland waR the pivot of the ' security zone ' which the
USSR was constructing ~long its western frontiers. Since the purpose
of this E.ast European buffer is to constitute an advance military
defence Une for ::;oviC't tc't'l:"itory and an .ideological barrier isolating
the Soviet peoplc$ from Wesl('t"n influcnct'-, 'tithere could be no question
of allowing Poland any sp~cial frcedom~ in either of these domains.
- 16 - tiE 78. 127j'fin.since 1968 the Po l ish leadership has in fact frequently pro-
claimed that it accepted this overall system unquestioningly and
embraced it in all its aspects.
It is one of the characteristics of the Soviet version of Socialist
internationalism that it is the foundation of inter- state relations
among Sac ialist countries as much as of those between the parties.
It thus represents 11 new and more constraining system of relations
within the Socialist camp.
~!h~_~2H~!LI1)29~r'
Nevertheless, simultaneously with these developments, there has
evolved within this Socialist community of East European countries a
Polish model' which differs in several points from the Soviet .one.
Among its specific features the following are the most notable:
- an agriculture which is, for the most part, uncollectivizedi
- a Church, socially cohe.sivc and independent of the State, which
claims to speak for the nation 
- an intelligentsia which asserts its duty to criticize.
The Church, the intelligentsia, the peasants are three of the
fundamental components of polish society; and the somewhat paradoxical
essence of the ' Polish model' is the following; the all-powerful
Socialist State, constitutionally incapable of any accommodation with a
civil body which might influence or moderate it in aoy way, has been
obliged, since 1956, to cohabit with a nation thus composed.
The political characteristics of this model are thus the following:
- the State has to make conccssions to this civil body even as it vainly
attempts to reduce its strength;
there is a search for a compromise between Party and Nation, aimed
at restoring the authority of t,he PartY- Qver the nation, but also
at gaining thE'. Latter s coofhknce 
- effortf ",ra made to achieve at least the appearances of a social
consensus,
- 17 - FE 78. 127/fin.The concessions which the P~rty has had to IT\nke to the nation
during, or in consequence' t)1 , various crises (1956, 1970, 1975-76,
1980-81) have: on each occasion been chipped away. but have proved
lasting in their essentials.
Tn~_s:e~n!~!;
Since August 1980 the widespread working-class ' revolt t which led
to the establishment Df a trade union movement free of Party control
has been putting the finishing touches to the Polish ' heterodox modeL
Heterodox. beciluse thll". id~Hi that a workers ' movement could exist, and
not ordy as a pe...m~m('.nl inll'rlocutoj" for the aut,hor-ity, tn,It nl!lo .';\1'1
a key participant in the df'.elsion-maldng  proce!1l!'!, is a phenomenon
entirely alien to the Sovj.et system.
Individual farming, the status of the Church of Poland, a degree
of freedom accorded to the intellectuals, and so on - these were
accomrrodations which did not affect the core of the political system.
But the nature of that system was changed, and profoundly, by the
emergence of independent trade union forces. Thus, the Party might
allow the ~hurch to have a voice in recognition of its historical
role in Poland, and also because the Church did not attempt to set
itself up, in virtue of that role, as a fully active partner on the
political stage. But, in n state s;upposed to be constructed in
accordilnce wi th the communi!lt blueprint, the working ' class is not at
the periphery, but is I of'  the system itself, and the Party' s power is
legitimized by its identification with the workers.
When this identif ication ceases, the source of the Party ' 5
legitimacy is cut off.
It was thu~ the events of August 1980, without parallel in the
whole Communist world, have created a totally unprecedented situation.
Until that moment, the Polish ' system ' had specific features which
migtt not be tolerated outside POland, but which nevertheless could
be accepted 'rlithin that  country, since they were generated by factors
specific to its national life.
The events of 1980  however, went mu~h further in posing a
fundamental challenge to the system. ' These events have shaken the
very foundations of the system in which we live. The cardinal principle
of the funct5,c;;:!.ng or every social institution - the principle of the
- 18  PE 78.l27/fin.State s monopoly in the areas of organization, information and decision-
making - has been challenged' (J. Ruron, ' Un chemin sans retour
Espri~, January 1981, p. 68).
'1' 111"'.. Soviet press was quick to note the point, stating (Pravda,
BO, article by Petro\.) that the strikers ' derr.:mds had ' political
aspects which concealed counter-revOlutionary aims ' and that they
Were seeking to have ' an anti-Socialist opposit1on legalized'
Evidently, in the view of the Soviet press, the strikes were
not due to any failures in the political system, but to errors in
management and distort ions in the methods and in the Socialist
l;ippro.:nch' (~!avda. of 31. 80 and 1. 80).
It fell to the Italian Communist Party, in its continuing coo-
frontfttion with Moscow, to provide the best analysis of the situation.
Posing the questlon: ' What i9 the origin of the crises wt.ich
periodically bzaak Dut in Dne ar other country that calls itself
Socialist? II there not perh~ps a much deeper reason which is tD dD
with the Soviet mcdel itself?' , it spoke of the authoritative pro-
ncuncements Df Moscow wticb had transformed the thoughts of Marx
and Lenin fro~ instruments of analysis into dogmatic ideological
systems. More specifically in connection with the Polish crisis,
the Italian Party stated: ' The real problem is basically this: a
refusal to accept that the process of renewal should question a
particular medel, its essent L'tl structures .:'.rId the ideological system




CHAPTER I r I : THE ECOKCMIC FAILURE
'rOd;~y' the Party is trying to put the blame for its own mj stakes
on the nation.
But, cont.r~":y to what H.ose in power would like tc. te believed,
the disintegration of the PolLsh economy did not begin in August 1980,
but in the middle of the 19708. And it was caused, net by the indepen-
der.t trade unions but by centralized and inefficient management. Or;
a thcr:oughgcing Jr('form both of the economy and of the Stdte could have
remedied the situation.




Undoubtedly, social and political developments in Poland 
through.~' out the Seventies testified to a desire on the part of the 
le;1de'7shi.p to modernize the country, and, on the part of the population, to
acquire rapidly the consumer benefits it had sc. long been deniecL
After the stagnation and disco'l1tagement characterizing the end
of the ' Gomulka era , this was a period of lively economic activity,
at least until 1975-76.
Unfortunately, thi s dynaU'.ism Was acccmpanied by en:ors and
constraints which evC'ntally WEre to prove fatal ar.d result in the present situation.
1. When, at the teginning of the 1970s, Gierek launched Poland on a
course of unprececented eccnomic development, he did so at the
price of an external debt which grew from year to 
yeat' until 
achieved intolerable proportions.
2. Moreover, the investment policy of the 19705 WaS totally chaotic,
wr.ilc- the agricultur.J.l policy resulted in 
criticD~  shortage". of foed.
3. Anc.ther negative factor was the existing pt 
i~:(; s:' stem,  1;1i~ u:: ;.'i'J3 arbitrary and contrary to every economic law. But if the necas
pr ice changes were to be accepted they wcl11d have had tc be inLrC.n dJ.:ced as part of a ra~::ical reform of the ent.ire economic syste!1L
-4. Beginning in 1976 the energy crisis came to compOund t.
he existi. deep-rooted structural crisis, which indeed it helped to revea~.
5. As in other pat"ts of Eastern Europe, the worsening economic situation
was most acutely felt as a shortage of 
foOd  products.
Among the causes of the economic crisis in Eastern Europe must
be counted, as we know, excessively centralized planning, corruption,
nepotism and profiteering, ImJ productiYity of investments and of
labour. But, in addition, one must not forget the
inflation-' generating energy shortages and the fact that booming East-West trade had made the
Socialist countries more sensitive to changes in the world ~conomic
environment.
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Neither the strategy of rapid economic growth introduced in 1971.
nor the ' changed course ' of 1976 (reduction of growth rates and of
imports, development of export industries, accelerated output of consume~
goods) could unblock the stagnation in every sector of economic activity
or significantly improve living standards, which are still lower than in
the GDR, Cz~choslovak ia or Hungary.
l"olnnd, once a major t!xfmrter or (ood staples, haa now been force4
to import them: though rich in natural resources, the countJ:Y Seems
unable either to organize its industrial output or to make foreign
trade the motor of economic expansion.
The inefficiency and total stagnation of Poland' s economy mean
that, far from achieving growth, or even :e;ero growth, it. .i,s fiimply not.
capable of securing its citizens 0 sUb$istenc~.
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, NORMALIZATION'
CHAPTER I: PRELIMINARIES TO .THE MILITARY ' COUP'
~~-_!~g_
~~!r~miJm~
Shortly b~fore 13 December 1981 two radical tendencies emerged in pol~nd
J.. i ~
leeh W8tes~ was having difficulty in restraining his own ' hardliners ' who
were now openly call ing for ' the Communist Party incapable of rising to the
demands of the situation to be swept away . On the One hand, Sol idarity had be-
come a popular movement, indeed it came to voice the feelings of a whole nation
and at its meetings political debates were taking place that, had the country a
different socio-political structure, could have been held in a different forum.
On the other haRd, Authority, bogged down in its internal contradications, was
proving incap~ble of starting a genuine and constructive dialogue with Solidarity
and the Church; its proposals for a ' national understanding ' did not ring true
(witness th~ historic me~tif'lg of 4 November between Jaruzelski , Glemp and Wales a).
Solidarity" a spontaneous mass movement, had not prepared any organized system
of clandestine opposition: any such preparations wouLd have been totaLLy contrary
to the movementO s naturer obsessed as it was with democracy of procedure and
opennes.s of debate. IAhi Le Solidarity expected an earLy confrontation, it had not
foreseen the possibility of an ' internaL normalization ' in the shape of a military
takeover. When it  came,  it caught Solidarity totally off its guard. Furtherffiore,
the sudden communications clampdown completely disrupted such orders for a
general strike (i!nd passive resistance as 'it did is$ue.
2. The P!i_r:!l
\4ithin the Piilrty" too, there .was a radicalization of opinion. Split between
th~ ha~liners and the moderates, unable to conceal its uncertainties and its
contradictions, obliged to change its First Secretary twice, 
toe  Party had been
succumbing on all fronts for eighteen months. At the same time, the economic
cri$is was reaching catastrophic proportions.
ct. Le Mende diplomatique, January 1982
~. ~ ~~~
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have never rGtognized Sol idarity as a partner.
The version of a ' Front of national reconciliation ' which they proposed to
Solidarity lacked credibility: they were asking a trade union of 10 million
members to allow itself to be represented on, - and thus to endorse - a typically
Communist and totally unrepresentative ' front' , comprising a number of organi-
zations which were feudatories of the Party. Admittedly.. this imbalance would
be PClrtly offset by the reQui rement of consensus for every major decision.
Solidarity could also count on the support of the representative of the Church
and of that of the intellectuals. But this did little to diminish the flagrant
disproportion in the composition of the proposed ' Front'
In any case, within a fortnight of these pseudo-negotiations , the Party
Plenum was demanding from the Diet that it pass an emergency law which would have
effectively abolished the democratic gains of the Gdansk Agreements. In a letter
to the Deputies, Monsignor Glemp asked them not to vote for the law. The vote
had not taken place by the time December 13th ~rrived.
B. Preparations for the~ilitar~takeover
The Party was no longer in control: either over the ' nation or over itself.
But if C'Jmmul,\,ist power had lo!;t all authority" it still held the instruments of
10rce= the militia and the army.
It controlled the military/security apparatus and, in the last resort, it
could rely on the support of the Soviet Union. Set up by the Soviets to serve
their own designs, this apparatus had been conceived from the outset a.s an ins-
trument that, together with the Party, would ensure Soviet domination over
Poland. It had taken part in the invasion on Czechoslovakia in 1968 and it had
fired on a defenceless crowd in Gdansk in 1970.
CHAPTER! I: 13 DECEMBER 1981
-~-
1~_Ib~_lQ9if _21 _f2Lf g
The logic of liberty gave way to the logiC of force. The only internal
resource that Communist power still had available, was that of repression.
So came the military ' coup . And so the regime admitted that ' its sole foun-
dation was brute forc~' (C.Castoriadi~' le plus dur et le plus fragiLe des
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and seen to be nothing but armed force. The political men simply stood back
hoping to be reinstated by Jaruzelski and the other military leaders, Party
members all.
Normalization ' was the abolition of the  democratic renewal and a return to
the norm - which, in a Communist regime, inevitably means the leading role of
the Party in the nation s life. In his s~eech on 13 December 1981 the Chairman
of the Mil itary Council of National Salvation (W. ) thus defined the
purpose of the state of siege: ' The measures which have been taken today serve
to safeguard the essential conditions for a Socialist renewal'
General JaruzeLski went On to say that ' none of Poland' s problems could, in
the long term, be resolved by force ' and that they could only be solved on the
basis of a national accord.. the principle of which he maintained and confirmed.
This was why, he said, they were ' not seeking revenge ' and there would be '
return to the improper methods and practices of before AuQ\.Ist 1980' . He repeated
these statements before the Sejm on 25 January 1982.
~ ~- In ~ _1 ~g ~ 1- sylb2 !il~ _i Q ~2 ~~g
Actually, General Jaruzelski'  5 assumption of emergency powers was formally
perfectly legal. 'It would, in fact , be difficult to condemn a military coup
d'e'tat in a country where one  de facto power displ$ces another. It would mean
conferring the sl':mblance of legitimacy on the preceding regime, which itself had
been imposed upon the people in no more democratic a manner that its present
successor I (1"1. Tatu, ' Et le Part i '?' Le Monde 16 December 1981).
Art. 33, para. 2 of the Constitution of 14 February 1976 permits the
proclamation of .., stlJlte of siege: ' The Council of State (the collective Head of
the Polish State) may proclaim a state of siege....., if considerations of
defence or of security of the State ~o require
Art. 33 point (1) deals with the state of war ( stan wojny) and point (2)
with the state of siege ( stan wojenny
Pow~r to declare the stat~ of siege ;s discretionary and is vested in the
Head of State (the Council of State) alone. The conditions required for its pro-
clamation are, in any c&se" far from restrictive. Nevertheless, Gen. Jaruzelski
thought it wi$~ to have the takeover endorsed by a vote of the Die,t on 2S Jan,:,ary
1982.
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The scope of repressive measures based on the !!state o'r siege ' is considerable:
- Trade union activit leS, strike act ion and pol itical activity have been made
illegal.
- Mi l itary tribunals operate in accordance with an emergency procedure. Judgments
pronounced &t the conclusion of such expedited proceedings are not subject to
appeal, except by the State prosecuter.
- The Poles are experiencing a classical .mHiury occupation which has plunged the
whole nation in despair and hate. Restrictions on movement , patrolling and checks
by the mi l itary, censorship of letters, interruPtion and tapping of telephone
communications, personal and domestic searches, ' inspections ' of farms, arrests
for infringements of the martial law, ~Jithholding of passports, refusal of entry
to foreign press prepresentatives, censorship of the domestic press ~ all these
create an intolerable situation for the Poles, even if  they  do manage occasionalLy
to circumvent some of  the  prohibitions.
CHAPTER II  THE . CHANGED COURS~
8~-2~~Q1Q~~
1 ~- fQD 11  D!:!ln9  - !~Qr~~~1 
The dismemberment of5olidarity and of the opposition circles has not resolved
a situation which was already deadlocked.
Six months after the takeover:
- thousands 01 interned trade-unionists are still waiting to be set free;
- many political sentences are still being issued under the emergency procedure;
- '
declarations of loyalty are  still being wrested, under threat of dismissal
from their jobs, not only from civil servants, but also from judgesp journalists,
teachers and even sc i ent i fie research workers;
- the purges continue and affect even those moder-ates ho might serve as intermediaries
in starting a dialogue;
- the universities ' autonomy has been destroyed. During the period when they had
regained ~c~demic independenc8, the university Rectors had been properLy elected
by the Univer$ity Councils. The Rector of W&rs&w University has now been removed by
the 8uthoriti0$. Indignation among the academic body was such that his appointed
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recent ly the Gdansk Rector has been removed from off; ce and replaced by an appointee
of the authorities.
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Although the internment of its officials, and especially of Lech Walesa , was
R h~avy blow to Solidarity (which has been ' suspended' but is still legal), and
&l though th~ authorities are doing thei r best to disrupt its or9ani~ation, the
mov~ment remains - and the events of 1 and 3 May l$st proved it once again - an
import~nt Md vigerous expression of flat ional feelings, whi ch  re  in total opposi-
t ~ Of! to those now in power.
The luthorities , on their part, even as  they  resume appeals for a ' front of
national unity " are helping to consolidate, by their continued purges, a
rejectionist front' . Even the official press openly bemoans the political isolation
of the rulers"  Trybuna Ludu The Peoples Tribune , the organ of the Party
Central Committee, however, deplores ' the spirit of resistance to reality ' which
the Poles are supposed to exhibit, and calls for a I re-education of the Polish
$0ciety' There is now virtually no popular participation in public affairs and
author H)' has no conhct with any truly representativE! social groups.
Th'? whole nation h&s gone dissident.
~Qt th&t ~ tod~y, there is any movement towards a head-on confrontation, an
insurrection or eVl'!fi active mass resistance - what is taking place is rather a
mOl/emfilt of ' internal emigr2ition . It effectively completes the cleavage between
th",,- Nat-;on and th~ State.. thus paralysing the latter. Inde.ed, the erosion of power
of those for-mally in charge has gone so far that they seem uI'Il ik. ely ever to regain
- (itht!r as civil &drrdnistration or as 'Party with leading roLe
AU this reduces the prospects tor the cHalogue necessary both for economic
r;:cover)' MO for regaining nationaL sovereignty, with those freedoms which had
Deenrecentty won. Nor can the situation change as long as authority continues to
assiC\"!: that ' th\V1 common aim of all PoLes (sic!) in this decade is continued socia-
li$t f~newal' and that their ' common good is in the sovereign Socialist State
(Comm';tte~ for trade union affairs of the Council of Mini$ters' Proposals concerning
th~ tr&d~ union ffiovement' p March 1982).
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fa) Six months after the military tak~over" the study strengthening of coerc'i\l~
measures has considerably undercut hopes  for  any ' imminent' liberalization.
The rule of  force  progresses by its own logic: the state 01 war declared
~9ainst the workers and the intellectuals has now been extended to the peasantry,
whose independence, together with tl1&1 of the Church, constitutes the main defence
against th~ regime s hold over the nation. following the militarization of the key
sectors of industry, army ' oper"l~tionalgroups /!.Ire  now checking what stocks,  are
held by the private farmers# who work over 70% of the agricultural land# and what
output they proQucew However , the-riE has been no formal requisit ioning so far.
Since hostility towarosthe rulers remains acute both in cities and in the
countrys;de# the Army wi II remain to the fore: ' The Army and theM; l itary Counei 
of National S~lvat;on are the two guarantors of the existence .and the functioning
of a strong State today
' ('
Draft long-term action programme of the P. ~Mond~,
25 March 1962).
(b) This continuation of the ' state of wal' l carries the dsk of uLtimate civil
war.
First , because, as the Polish Catholic Union deputyp J. ZabLocki , said in the
Diet on 25 january 1982: ' The price of the ~tate  of  seige is the restriction of civ'l
rights and the interruption of the dialogue between Authority and the Nation
It also entails a double danger: on the one hand" that ' those in power !'Jill acQlJir~
the habit of arbitrary government which takes no account of public opinion because
it is not carried on in the open and is no'c subject to pvblic cantr'ol' ; and , on
the other, that ' the nation will become accustomed to a situation in which Authoritl
is regarded as an exteroal # foreign# element, either mandated by the people nor
respons i b le Defore it'
L6stly# it is not It all certain that 8 p~Dtr,cted state of siege under
Gen. Ja.ruzelski' s rule will be toLerated either by the Party ' reactionaries ' or by
the Kreml in. For , in the long run, the ' m i 1 i t Iry option ' is a dang! rous one and
the new role &$signed by Jdruzelski to the Army i$ lilH~ly to put ideas into the
heads that wear the peaked capg - not only in Poland but aLso in other Warsaw
Pact countries (1'1. Tatu,  le f'1onge
j',~ '
14 March 1982).
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(,m) The economic reform" regarded as the main hop~ forgetting the country out
of th~ crisis" and initially scheduled for 1 January last , has to all intents and
purposes be~n postponed.
The regim,* coo'fines itself to sermonizing which falls on deaf ear.s: ' Increased
output is the first priority for all the patriotic forces of the country
' ('
Pro~
posals concerning the trade union movement' from the Committee for trade union
I!1fhirs of the CouncH of Ministers, march 1982).
rh~ sY$t~m h~$ thus so far resisted all fundamental reform. A show 01  reform
" nev~rtheleS$p being made in some areas, not least as regards efforts to get
a9ricutl~!re production going:
- on 25 and 26 March 1982  the  Diet adopted a number of acts concerning agriculture,
and consider~bly improving the situation of the individual farmers. Private farms"
Mhieh haw: now been recognized as ' 8 durable element of the economic system ' can
now h3Vi? an area of up to 100 ha, as against 20 ha heretofore. Regulations on
regrouping of land holdings - the main purpose of which unti l now had been to make
life for private farmers more difficult - have also been eased. These measures
~I".r: (("arty IM!&nt to be tokens of 90001011 II towards the farming community and to
$ome ext~nt they reflect points in the agreem~nts signed with Rural Solidarity
10 f~bruary 1981;
- ~lso on 25 and 26 March th~ Government presented ~n agricultural develpment pro-
gf&mm0 until 1985 meant to make the country gradually self-sufficient in food.
This ,,1m ",t.~H:i seems to be at the back of one of the texts on ' the protection of
agri(;ultl..!, &l landl voted by the Diet which gives the State greater power of
control over l&Jnd use;
- on 7 April 1982 a Socia-economic Consultative Council 'inspired' by one of
Solida;' s Q",a~5 ~as set up ~mder the auspices of Parliament. However, what
Solidarity had demanded was the cr..tion of & second Chamber to represent the
t rlJd~) '.11'-101"1\$"
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POLISH SOCIETY: IT T~~ES TWO TO ' DIALOGUE
Social ist Authority and a r~cently muzzled Nation are eyeball to ~y~ball in
Poland today.
This fact is the fact from which must start any search for co'.existence" for
a modus  vivendi based on a finely balanced equi  ibrium between Authority on the
one hand and th~ vital forces of the Nation: Church" trad~ unions, intellectl:lalsp
young peopLe" etc., on the other.
If thi$ is to  be  achieved, the conditions Must be created for a national
accord' 8. S to the remedies that can be appl ied. One of the essential conditions
is that public opinion should be voiced, which implies the abolition of censorship
and ending the State monopoly of the information media.
CHAPTER I: THE CHURCH
~.:._
! ~~ - ~ t!YJ: ~h_
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1. Th~ Church in Poland isa spe~ial ~ase in the Socialist camp. Historic develop-
ments have conferred on Poli~h Catholicism an altogether extr"aordinary social
strength: enou~n to recall that 80 - 85% of Poles consider themselves as believers.
In the other Socialist countries, where the Church is subservient to the State
there has never been such a degree of identification between national consciousness
and religious conscience. The exemplary conduct of the clergy in the resistance
against Hitlerism, the memory of men like Mgr. A.S. Sapieha,Archbishop of Krakow,
or Maxim; 1 ian KolbeR have meant that the people could recognize the Church as its own.
What is more , since the end of the Second World War , the Church has come to repre$ent
national legitimacy in the facp of rulers seen as representatives of a foreign
interest.
One paradoxical result of the Communist social revolution of 1944
, which
deprived the people of the traditional support 0' th~propertied classes " was to
strengthen its union with the Church. Vatic~n II provided doctrinal backing for the
Church' s new social awareness. The Church in Poland thus enjoys not only its
tradional social pre~tigep but is seen as the only independent institution within
the country, a unique source of inspiration and standard reference for the opponents
of the of1icial ideology.
- 29  PE 78, 127/fin,Even the !H:culal" Left admits that it cannot imagine a Poland without the
Church .nd the influence it .xerts.
2. In Fil'!cei'it yei'Jl"s , the partial removal of a number of constraints of E?very kind
(fin~nci~l $nd ~dministrative obstacles to the construction of Church buildings
denial of access to  the  information media and to education, harassment of youth
of'gsnh&1t ions find of worker's hk1ng part in rel 19ious observances,  etc. placed
by th* State on the propogation of its doctrine and teaching, has enabled the
Church to voice even more clearly the demands .01 the people and to point out social
needs. But whil~ socially committed - and thereby gaining even greater confidence
in the eyes of the people - the Catnol ic community knows that precisely because it
h('ls the potentilJil to become a dominating force within the nation means that it
must not 0..ng6lg~ 'in political action. While stoutly opposing the ruling Socialist
idt'ology.. the Church in Poland acCepts it as a political and social fact of life.
30 Nevertheless, if the Church.. as a general rul~avoids all political coniron-
t~tion:
"it does not flinch from t/!lking a public stand on sl.Ich fundamental matters as
freedom of el~ctions and freedom for trade unions, or from taking up the cudgels
on b0half of independent farmers (Declaration by the Episcopate in the public
dt;bate on tnli:' constitutional revision of 1976);
~ simHo!Jrly. thf:' Church advocates democratization by the extension of civil
liberties and an evolution of the existing pol itical system, but at the same
tii11fl' it is careful not to put forward larger but unrealistic, political or
$oci15\t demi'mds;
- rnoreolJer~ IrJhHe the Church has rejected illusory and dangerous temptations of
anY, even temporary, political cooperation with the Government , it does support
till". 1!Juthorit ies ' efforts to increase the State s economic potential and hence
patently, was the attitude of Cardinal Wyszynski who,
whole nation, reminded the strikers of August 1980
that (lathing c~n be obtained wi thout work;
rHit ional independence. That
speak ing of the needs of the
- finally, whil~ the Church refuses to take up for itself a strictly political
rote which dou not belong to it, it wants to see, in line with its advocacy
01 fundament&l civic ri9hts, th~ laity being given a .recognized and representa-
tive plac~ in the n~tion$i political life.
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1~ The Church , whichalwaY5 exerts a calming influence in times of serious
tension, is incontestably a permanent factor of social stabi l ity in Poland.
At the same time it remains fundamentally committed to democracy and respect for
the human person. Already at the time of the 1976 strikes
, the Church had called
on the authorities to end repression and proclaim an amnesty. Today again, it is
actively engaged in aiding the victims of repression.
Proclaiming its desi re to protect human rights, the Church refuseS to adoPt
a neutralist position, which would lose it credibility in the eyes of 
the  nation,
and it is able to exercise effective pressure for democratization.
2. Since the introduction of the state of siege the Church has not ceased to call
for realism and levelheadedness: "Sagacity means action ' in a premeditated manner
and not merely responding to slogans such as : ' Now or never ' all or nothing
Mgr Glemp $aid on 7 March 1982. After the violent demonstrations on 
1 and 3 May
last , he emphasized the point again in a speech to young people: '
We cannot afford
today the Luxury of ill-judged... unreasonable or hasty actions, for they carry
too high a price ' (9 May 1982).
Indicating a long-term strategy, the Primate of Poland preaches national recon-
ciLiation: The Government , the Church, the trade unions and the young generation
should thus be united in social concord' (7 March 1982) and he ~olemnly offers
himself ' for the service of national understanding ' (11 April 1982), But the Church
also reminds those in power today that, as pver, the success of any plan for nation3L
recovery depends essentially on the rulers ' abi lity to win the whole nation over
to this cause. But how can there be confidence in a political system in which not
all citizens can fuLLy enjoy their rights and where, in particular, those who are
bel ievers ' become second or third-class citizens and are deprived of their
chances of social advancement, professional career and the opportunity to hold
certain offices of responsibi l ity' (John Paul II , speech to the UN, 1979).
0n 5 Apri l last the Cathol i c Hierarchy adopted as thei r own the ' theses on
social concord' , drawn up by the Polish Pr;ma s Lay councillors... which set forth
the hopes for democratization contained in the Gdansk agreements.
The Church has thus consistently insisted both on the need for, and possibility
of a compromise - which the authorities apparently will not hear of. The
church' s most ardent wish is that society shouLd not be divided
, '
with, on the one
- 31 - PE 78.l27/fin.side, rulers who order and compc.1 and, on the other, subjects who cannot speak
but only hate' (Mgr Glemp, 6 January 1982).
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Because of its attitudes and its principles, too Church in Poland today
represents:
... an essential factor in the dialogue with Authority
- a factor of support for the people and for Solidarity
... a factor of IOOderation: ' Poland has already spilled  too  much blood for
freedcrn~ (John Paul II)
- a factor of steadfastness in the defence of human rights and the rights .
workers.
CHJ\P'I'ER I I :
---
THE FREE TRADE UNIONS
!!~~ - ~1 2!! ~ _1 !!_~h~ - ~~i ~~ -~!:!!!!2 ~ - Y2~~
1. ~~L!;;h~Y_~2L~
- In the Soviet system, trade unions must be Socialist in character,
comply with the Constitution (which ~'knowledges the dominant
role of the Party) and ob::;erve the unity of the trade union IOOvement.
- Moscow also recalls that Lenin was fiercely opposed to trade unions
which are 'free in relation to the final objectives of the working-
class struggle to achieve Socialism and Cannunism, or ~ndependent
of the interests com:non to the entire working class. Such a point
of view was and still is either a bourgeois provocation of the
worst kind or an utter and servile misunderstanding of yesterday I s
slogans. (Pravda, 25. 80)
- Not only i8 thE' concept of  free trade unions rejected, the possibility
of conduct, i nq ncgot.ic"'\t.ions with strike ccmni ttees is also excluded.
~2~-tb~Y_~~Y_~9~_
. l The very concept of independent trade un~ons J.s a challenge to
the cmnipotence of the Carmunist Parties whiCh see in them a facet
of society no longer under thei r control.
1 ~n the USSR, these trade unions have always been referred to as ' independent' 1.n l.nverted comnas or as ' so-called independent'
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heresy, the acknowledgc-mant that there are two supreme authorities,
not one.
The Polish example is a clear warning to the Soviet leaders
where a Carrmunist Party tolerates the gener.is and growth of a pr..pular ~t - li\1hatever its nature may be - vJhich is outside the control
of the Party, the Party s authority over society is reduced Gmd the
Party beccmes the target of the workers! !OCIt~!'It instead of ita
spearhead.
~~~1~2fX~ _f~ i 2~~ ~~ ti 2~
When theCdansk lIqreements were signed, each of the former trade
unions declared themselves to be ' independent and self-governing
' .
The trade union leaders voted to withdraw frqn the central trade union
organization (CRZZ).
The next, phas,' wj tnessed the prc:rnulgation of the order for unity
in the trade union movement.
At t.he VIIth plenary session of the PlJWP' s Central Committee,
the present Deputy Prime Minister, Mr Rakowskj_, referred to the need
to adapt the new trade unions to the political system and not the
system to the trade unions. But in 1980, Solidarity had SO/1:e
7 million members out of a total workforce of 16 million. It was
thus too powerful an. organization to coexist with the rules in ferce.
Solidarnosc (Solidn.rity)
The history of Solidarity, ilS development, the hopes it. engendered
in Poland and the rest of the world, lt$ leaders, especially Lec:;h Walesa,
their struggles, successes and inter~nt, the indomitable resistance
of a !.tarving but unbov..red nation which had tast..eR the freedom of which
.it had bcc-n deprived and W.IS d0te:rmined not to have it takf'n away aguin,
whatever the cost : all Uklt i;.; GO!m\On knowledge.  v.J~  shall, therefore,
do no rrore than draw practical conclusions from these events and make
proposals designed to safegua~'d for Poland in the futUIe : respect for
human rights, the survival and reconcHiation of the Polish natiof'1;
the f r~(.1ana it, has r~Ei i ned and the cleve lcpmsnt of it.!; e\:onomy.
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the free and self-governing trade unions have become such a major
objective that it is necessary to explain briefly why this trade union
movement has also beceme an essential feature of Polish society 
indispensable partner in the dialogue between Authority and that
!Society.
Sol:i.darity is a trade union movement that has taken on the dimensions
of a (Jreat popular lroVe100nt which voices the feelings of a whole nation
and proposes a specific concept of society.
The events which took place in Poland in 1980/1981 consti tute a
civil revolution, a peaceful revolution against the injustice and
indifference of the political Hystem.
The oovernent began in the factodesMd then spread until it erroraced
virtually eVery s~ctor of society, from the trade unions to the various
pr~fessiona! organi zations.
The dynamism engendered by the strikes in the sl11mler of 1980 . is
visible simultaneously in various spheres : the workers' movements, the
democratic opposition and national emancipation movements, spheres
vm  ich at times overlap so much that they are almost entire) 
y : 
ndisting-
uisbable illlO at. othcm so separate t.h~t .in Bare aspects thc'y i\re in
opposition to each other (K. !?omian,  pologne - cefi .3. l' iITpOssihle 1
Par is, 1982. pp 227-228)
~!~~!~_
~!:~9~L!:!D!Q!:! ....
(at by virtue of its origins - it was creatE!d by the workers for
the workers.
1~e first strike (1-8 July 1980) was called simply to
support wage c 1.a i ms au!Jmit ted pr incipally to of f SE"t the increases
in t~ price of f(~tuffs, especially meat.
But soon the claims began to extend to genuinely popular
andtr ode union j s.mes : excessive working hours  low wages,
foodstuffs becaning increasingly scarce and expensive, an
increase in the number of accidents at work, submission to
Socialif.t working discipline' and increased output at alJ
costs.
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however, called for economic reasons but on propa- trade union
grounds : it demanded the reinstatement of two militants, Lec:h
WALESA and Anna WALENTYNOWICZ, who had been dismissed from their
jobs.
on 31 August, the strikers and the Government signed the
Gdansk Agreements.
on 22 Septemher a national conf€'dcration of independent trade
unions - Soliqilrn~sc - was formed, 35 independent trade unions
cQnbined to form it, and Lech Walesa was elected chairman.
(b) by virtue of its c..,.::-lQsition : for the first time, workers and
intellectuals joined together in a corcroon struggle to ensure respect
for their rights.
It is, of course, t.rue that intellectual rrovements, such as
KOR, had assisted interned strikers as long ago as 1976, and others
had devised educaHona1 and cultural courses to teach the working
class about thei.r freedoms (e.g. the Scientific Education Society).
Ho!il1Cver, it was after Gdi:msk and the birth of Solidarity
that this collaboration between workers and intellectuals was
organized on a permanent basis.
(c) by virtue of its recognition by the law of the land
23 Septembc'r : Bubrnission to t:he WarsClw district court of the formal
applicaUon for the registration  of  this fr-ee trade
union
24 October acceptance by the dist,rict court of the application,
but wi th the addition by the district judge of a
reference in the union' s,Constitution to the dominant
role of the PiOlr1,y
the S\,!prerne Court overturns the juOgri;ent of 24 October
and formally registers SolidarnOsc.
10 November
It took three rronths of campaigns, discussions and sb ikes to
achieve that success.
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suspended' the activities of Solidarh_
y, 
i'C has still not yet dared
to withdraw its recognition in law. 'We must not forget that this
trade union has become and still is the authentic representative of
the working class , and that this fact has  acknowledged and
confirmed by Authority (Pope John-Paul II).
Cd) by virtue of its recognition as the body representing Polish workers
in international trade union. organizations
The attendance ofLech Walesa and other leaders of Solidarity
in Geneva, Rome and Paris, i1l1d their participation in demonstrations
organized by international trade union bodies has clearly shown
that they are full ~2r:S of the world trade union IOOvement.
(e) by virtue of its claims
The Gdansk Agreements clearly set out the Polish Government'
acknowledqement of the right to establish independent and self-
governing trade unions, the right to strike, the limits on censorship,
the reinstatement of workers dismissed  from  their jobs, access to
the mass media and the release of political prisoners.
Of course, none of that was conclusively acquired when the
Agreements were signed, and none of it really ever will be. But the
aim of the trade unions, and in particular of Solidarity, was
precisely to secure the legal ratification of the Commitments under-
taken by the Government when it signed the Gdansk Agreements.
(f) by virtlle of its aims
The events in Poland have demonstrated the deep-seated
opposition of the working class to the official trade unions. That
is why the workers' pri ncipnl objective is now to demand free and
self-governing trade unions.
Soviet-style trade unions, On which the official Polish trade unions
are modelled, are based on t.hree principles which ultimately deprive the
working class of one of its majo)- achievements ot the 19th century :
:.. 36 -
PE 78. 127 Ifill.the institutionalization of the suprert~cy of the Party over the
trade unions;
the supremacy of administrative and li\i.magernent staff  over:  shop-floor
workers in the factorys ' trade unions brarlchea,
the supremacy of the 'higher ' echelons in the trade unions over: the
factory branches.
Centralism js another factor, in addition to the dual subordination
of the trade unions, which deprives the working class of genuine repres~
entation. What is more, centralized trade union activities prohibit, any
inter-factory liaison and hence any agreement or spread of ideas between
trade unions in different undertakings, Ixanches of industry or regions.
The c1emand for indefX'ndencc' is therefore a crucial objective .and
a prerequisite for genuine working-class trade unionism.
In short, the workerg ' dcmimds are designed to throw off the triple
yoke which shacklcs the wor-king class : rejection of the subOrdination
of the trade union to the 'Party apparatus, abolition of the predominance
of management staff iti track! union factory branches, and abolition of
centralism.
~ 11 ~~ ~Y - b~~ = ~Y~!~9~i 9~e_
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(a) by virtue of the number of its members
In a short peri.ad of time, the membership of Solidarj. ty has
risen to more than 8 mi11ion. It has then!Ofore tx-"CCXf.",- by far the
rct)St repreRentati ve 'tJOrkere ' organization"
(b) by v~tue of ! he p.JpuliJr support it has received
Solidarity represE!nts the struggle (")fthe Polish people for
bread and freedom. It iE; an atteropttp rerOLTiI tb.e political
system progressively and peacefully.
Developments in Poland have occu.rr:ed in the form or a silTple
logic of freedom' , gradually winrling oller t.he: whole of society
to its concept of a democrat ie Poland.
- 37 - PF. 78.JI7/fin.Born in the factories and shipyards, Solidarity has never
contented itself wit,h simple demands for improvements in working
conditions. Since! its formation it has expMded its activities
which arp., ahove allb Mti..tot~lit,m:;ian in nature.
(c) by virtue of the organiz~t.ion with wh.ich it has equipped itself
;~t &11 JevelR
~he junta ~rrested and interned more than 7, 000 of Solidarity
leaders in its i:tttempt to stifle it, but :it has not succeeded in
JdlHng it off. Although its leaders have been assigned to different
camps under more or less $evere conditions, kept in isolation and
scm;; ~. as first announced on 11 June .. treat.ed in psychiatric
hospitalst the organi:u:.tions s vitality ha$ not been destroyed.
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ATTITUDES ANi) ACTIONS  OHHE TEN




CHAPTER I: MEASURES VIS-A-VIS THE USSR
--  ,.  .,  --.,.-...---.. , "
f~eas\'!res in the  ..rea  of trade were /)lready €If'\viuged at the meeting of thtt
~i Dig!~r2_Qf- EQr ~i ~o_~il~ir~ -Q~- ~~D~!r~_12~,.
Cs) Th~ Ten undtrtook first of &ll to consult with the United States so as not
to hinder Amedcfm measures against th1!1' USSR. But 1'10 specific action was sub-
sequently 0nvi st Community level to give effect to this undertaking.
(b) "Chi!? T0n o/Ioule $vbs'ilquenUy considl:r ' meiJisures concerning credit  C..  :1 and
measures concerning the Community! $ commercial pol icy with regard to the USSR. 
(8) The intt'ntions of the Ten h.rld first practical application in the Council
deci!don 01 15 f0bruaty 19132 (with Greece voting against) whereby the Commission
was authorized to r",negotiate the CECD consensus on export credits so as to have
the USSR cl in Category i cd purchaser countri€s.. which would mean raising
the rate of interest by & quarter of a point
....
(b) On 22 febrv&ry 1982 the Council of Ministers decided to take measures of
sufficent economi~ impact to represent I ' ..rious political signal' manifesting
displeasure with the USSR.
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to r~strain its cofflmerci~l exchanges with state-trading countries.
(c) On 15 March 1982 the Council decided to reduce imports of cert~in products
from the USSR.
In practical terms, the Counci l of Ministers of the Ten adopted on 15 March
1982 (with Greece voting against) two regulations under Article 113 of the Treaty
providing, first, for a reduction of imports of certain products originating in the
USSR and, secondly, suspendi n9 these measures; n respect of Greece 1
The regulation lays down the following restrictions on import arrangements
with the USSR:
- for 19 products currently liberalized at Community level, ell 25% redLJction 
imports compared with 1980. The volume of trade involved is about 319 million
ECU (initial Commission proposal: :!)9 products with III trade volume of 491
mi II ion ~CU),;
- for 40 products, currently subject to quotas in some Member States and liberalized
in others, a 50% reduction in the volume of imports compared with 1980. The
volume of trade involved is 128 million Eeu (Commission s initial proposal:
55 products with a trade volume of 340 feU).
The volume of imports envi saged would be 447 mi II ion ECU per year (on the
basis of 1980 figures) out of a total volume of Community imports of 10,
800 million
ECU, or approximately 4% (the Commission s initial proposal: 832 million ECU, or
approximately 8%). Now, 80% of Community imports originating from the USSR
consist of raw materials (9%) and ene.rgy products (70%) " while the regulation
concerns only luxury articles and manufactures (omitting products originaLLy
included in the list, such as furs, motor cars, watches, etc.
). Moreover, the
reguLation provides for derogations in favour of contracts already in force and
export licences already granted. And- the regulation provides that these measures
wi II remain in force only unti lDecember 1982.
, This derogation was justified by the stage currently reached in the gradual
integration of Greece in the Customs Union and by the special situat ion of
Greece ~ trade with the USSR and other East European countries.
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Their restricted scope and duration, the exclusions in favour of existing
contracts, and the nature of the products which they affect, make these Community
measures appear modest, which they in fact are.
(a) But if they are modest they ue neither negligible nor uselesf; - as witness
the USSR' s accusations of ' n blow struckattrede relations ' which they have
aroused. It should be noted at this point that the measures concern national trade
policies: there is no contractual relationship between the Community and the USSR,
the latter having consistently refused to recognize the EEC. Thus the Community
has not infringed any rule of international law.
The economi c impact in the Community of measures against the USSR at the
purely comm(i:rdsl level was bound.. in .any c.sse.. to be telat ively limited for
objective r.alonm: .xclulion of t$riff m~~syre., ~xi.ting contracts, current
l iceflce$p ~1:C.
At present the USSR9 $ balance of trade with the Community is positive and
shows a surplus of several thousand million dollars - thanks to which it is able to
purchase Amer;cf:\n, European and Japanese technology or agricultural products froM
allover the world.
i3y redudn~ 1:l'd$ surplus we have been able to ai'fect directly this purchasing
power w1thout harming either output or employment 1" the Community.
NevertheLess, the Ten top the list of the USSR9 s Western trade outlets , and
in comparison" the American measures have a vef'"y limited economic impact as far
as Ameri can interests are concerned.
(b) In any event" the economic aspect of the sanctions, although not negl igible
cannot be regarded .~ the malt t mportant.
The political impact is undoubtedly more significant. It is encouraging to
note that there is general conseSU5 (apart from the case of Greece) as to the
political advisability of the sanctions! Initially, one or two Member States had
let it be understood that th~y would problJlbly not be ab~. to participate in the
measures propo$ed.
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inscribed to the Community' s credit ..as a demonstration of Community political
solidlilrity - ~h;ch was the principal '111m of th~ Ten in this case.
~ .:._
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The question now before us is whether, and by what means, political pressure
01'1 the USSR can be increesed and a greater ffi8rgin of freedom of manouellre for the
lJIuthorities in Poland be encouraged without provoking direct USSR intervention.
Experi ence shows that sane t ions are on ly effect i lie if they a re concerted,
complemlilntary and loyally applied by all concerned. The 'first series of measures
introduced by the Ten were so appl  1ed.  TO increase pressure on the USSR a second
series of economic measures might now be envisaged ;1'1 which the emphasis would
be placed not so much on limiting or freezing imports, but on the grant ing of
future credits by the West to the USSR. In that case steps must be taken to ensure
that the unanimity continues both in the decisions and in the implementation. Care
must also be taken that the measures taken by the Europeans are closely concerted
with the United Sutesp whose first set of economic measures is very different
from the Europesn one.
The UniUd Sute~ h6\1e J!'!H"cntially conc€1f'1trljrt~d on me8sures affc(,t;ingexports
of the; r &dv~nced technology and ener~y~indwstry products. In contrast , the T~n
- the Soviet Union s main market 'In tl'teWest -  ft5lve introduc€d measurE'S affecting
imports of SQIJiiflt miH1\.dat:turers.
It seems, howev~r, certain that the Western European countries will not give
up the plans tor the Soviet gas pipeline and all the possibil it;es it opens for
its own technology exports.
follo~J$ that if in this area, as in the areas of credit, effective sanctions
are  to be 'Introch.Jced, it is essential that they should be coo!'dinated.
CHAPTER ,
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At the European Counc i l in Lwxembourg (Oec0mb""f 1980) the Nin(: re$ponded to
requests for economic support addressed to them by Poland. The Ccunei l of Ministers
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RESOLUTION
on the situation in Poland
The European Parliament
A. recalling its resolutions
of 9 April 1975 (' ), of 11 May 1977 (2), of 10 May 1978 (3) and of 15 October
1980 (4) on security and cooperation in Europe
of 18 September 1980 on human rights in Poland (5
of 17 December 1981 on the situation in Poland (6
of 17 December 1981 on the refugees from Poland (7),
of 21 January 1982 on declaring a day of solidarity with the Polish people on
30 January 1982 (8
B. having regard to the motion for a resolution tabled by Mr Israel on the situation in
Poland (Doc. 1-591/81),
the motion for a resolution tabled by Mr Romualdi and others on the state of emergency
in Poland (Doc. 1.891/81),
the motion for a re!'olution tabled by Mrs Macciocchi on the situation in Poland
(Doc. 1-1035/81),
the motion for a resolution tabled by Mr Gawronski on aid for Poland (Doc.
310/82),
C. having regard to the report of the Political Affairs Committee (Doc. 1-436/82),
I. As regards the CSCE
A. in the awareness that the crisis in Poland is an expression of the growing difficulties of
the Communist system in Eastern Europe that will burden East-West relations and
weigh heavily on the policy of security and cooperation in Europe
B. whereas the repressive measures taken by the Polish leadership under pressure from and
with the suPP9rt of the Soviet Union constitute an infringement of human rights and of
the Final Act of the CSCE signed in Helsinki in July 1975
C. in the conviction that the Polish tragedy cannot be removed from the context of the
Helsinki Final Act and that in signing those agreements, the European Community
entered into formal commitments in the matter of compliance with human rights (by all
signatories),
) OJ No C 95, 28, 4. 1975, p. 28.
(2) OJ No C 133, 6. 6. 1977, p. 32.
) OJ No C 131 1978, p. 47.
) OJ No C 291 10. 11. 1980, p. 24.
) OJ No C 265, 13. 10. 1980, p. 53.
) OJ No C 11 , 18.-1. 1982, p. 86.
(1) OJ No ell, 18. 1. 1982, p. 82.
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D. whereas the military take-over on 1,2-13 December 1981 and the introduction of
martial law are not simply an internal Polish problem, the specific responsibility of the
USSR in those events calling for a clear, firm and strong response
E. whereas liberties in Poland have, to an increasing extent, been wilfully suppressed
requiring specific measures to persuade the military junta to loosen its hold on the
country,
F. whereas the ruthless suppression of the demonstrations which took place on the second
anniversary of the Gdansk agreements indicate a new attack on the rights and freedoms
of the Polish people
1. Condemns the proclamation of martial law in Poland and the situation it has produced
as a threat to cooperation and security between peoples;
2. Considers that a return to the spirit of Helsinki on the part of all signatories is an
essential part of detente;
3. Points out that the policy of repression in Poland is putting the policy of detente in
Europe at risk;
4. Recalls the more fundamental point that detente, as manifested in the whole range of
mutual commitments of whicb it consists, is indivisible;
5. Declares that there is a connection between political and military detente and economic
and technological cooperation on the one hand and respect for human rights and
fundamental freedoms on the other;
6. Stresses, nevertheless, that the primary aim of the policy of the Ten remains that of
helping the Polish people along the path of democratic renewal;
II. As regards the USSR
A. having regard to the specific responsibility of the USSR in the present situation in
Poland;
B. noting that through direct interference and covert intervention, the USSR
(a) for a period of 18 months systematically pursued a policy designed to threaten and
pressurize Poland, a country in the process of democratic renewal:
intimidatory military exercises at its borders and even on Polish soil
the official declaration by the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party
demanding that 'the course of events be turned back'
the press campaign against the freedom movement begun in Poland
(b) gave active political support to the decision to take and the implementation of the
measures that were introduced on 13 December 1981
7. Takes note of the decisions to restrict certain imports from the USSR taken by the
Council of the Community on 15 March 1982 after the Member States had jointly
acknowledged the responsibility of the USSR for what had happened in Poland;
8. Supports the decision of the Versailles Summit to cooi'di:'nate the credit policy of the
main industrial Western democracies and Japan towards the USSR;
9. Recognizes that, should the present situation in Poland persist, there will be a demand
for a fundamental reassessment of the ECC's entire economic policy towards the USSR and
other Eastern European State-trading countries, notwithstanding the benefits both to the
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III. As regards Poland
Noting that:
A. the process of renewal in Poland had been underway for 18 months without call for or
resort to violence (on the part of the free trade union movements, notably Solidarity),
B. but the continuation Qf martial law has created an explosive situation
C. in effect, the continuation of martial law brings with it further cases of infringement of
the most basic human rights and the rights of citizens
D. continuation of martial law also hinders economic revival
Expresses its indignation that:
10. The militia continues to intern people for the opinions they hold;
11. The special courts set up under martial law render summary justice;
12. The number of cases of arbitrary dismissal is increasing;
13. 'The declarations of loyalty' which officials, magistrates, journalists , teachers and those
engaged in scientific research are required to make are a violation of conscience;
14. The disbandment of the Union of Polish Journalists and its replacement by an officially
appointed body simply represents a take-over of the media: press, radio, TV;
15. The campaigns in the pres radio and television, now in the hands of or subject to the
military, to discredit the leaders of Solidarity are growing louder;
16. It is also the continuation of martial law that allows the military junta in power to step
up its attempts to break the solidarity of the Polish people and, more especially, the
solidarity between workers and intellectuals, through discriminatory measures, assignment
to different camps and internment and pressure on some Solidarity members to go into exile
against their wishes;
IV. Martial law
A. whereas it is impossible to accept this growing oppression
B. whereas the numbers of detainees released are insufficient, and the thousands of new
arrests made following recent events are no more justified than those which have been
made since 13 December 1981
17. (a) wishes first to express its respect for the courage shown by those in Poland who
continue to fight for the preservation of liberty;
(b) pays special tribute to the determination shown by Lech Walesa and the leaders of
Solidarity who are either interned or operating in increasingly difficult
circumstances;
18., Recalls the urgent appeal it made in Strasbourg on 17 December 1981 for
(a) the repeal of martial law
(b) the immediate release of prisoners
(c) the resumption of the dialogue between the representatives of the Polish people
(government, church, Solidarity);
Insists on the following demands in particular:
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20. The trade union law being drafted by the Polish Diet should not only enshrine the
established fact of trade union pluralism but also effectively restore the right to a trade
union that has already been created and made legal;
21. The right of association must be restored in all sections of the population;
22. Freedom of information must be ensured by allowing foreign journalists to enter, freely
travel and freely report in Poland and by reinstating the union of Polish journalists;
V. Economic aid
A. whereas the resumption or e",tension of political and economic relations with Poland
must be made contingent on the extent of the change in the present situation,
23. Hopes that the West will be ready to grant substantial economic and financial aid to
Poland if a decisive change takes place in which the processes of democratic renewal begun
in August 1980 are resumed;
24. Recommends that the political and economic authorities of the West adjust their
decisions on economic and financial cooperation with Poland in the light of developments in
the internal situation of the country;
25. Demands that, notwithstanding the measures referred to in Section II and in
paragraphs 8 and 9 in particular, no new offers of credit and aid in any form whatsoever be
made for the time being  with the exception of food aid sent through charitable
organizations;
VI. Humanitarian aid
A. whereas it is necessary to step up humanitarian aid to the Polish people
B. whereas, regardless of the situation, solidarity with the Polish people implies that food
aid and humanitarian aid should continue
26. Calls on the President of the Commission of the European Communities to submit a
report to it on:
(a) .special aid in 1981
(b) general food aid in 1981;
27. Expects that the President of the Commission will also give details of food aid in 1982;
28. Approves the measures taken by the Council of the Community on 23 February 1982
to continue providing direct humanitarian aid;
29. Advocates support for all forms of private aid to Poland and, more specifically, that the
transport costs of aid organized by private individuals should be charged to the appropriate
items of the Community budget;
30. Calls on the governments of Member States which have not yet done so to facilitate the
sending of gift parcels by private individuals, by assuming direct responsibility themselves
for the postal charges involved;
C. whereas it is necessary to arrange also for humanitarian aid to Polish refugees,
31. Reminds the Council of the Community of its commitment to look into what can be
done to ease the situation of Polish nationals outside Poland who do not wish to return in
the present circumstances;11. 10. 82 Official Journal of the European Communities No C 267/85
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32. Calls on the Community Member States to join the non-European countries that take
immigrants in accepting the tens of thousands of Polish refugees who are still living in
refugee camps in Austria;
33. Specifically requests that long-term visas be granted to those Polish nationals in the
Member States who wish to postpone their return to Poland without applying for political
asylum;
34. Calls for continued assistance to Polish students and graduates for studies at
universities in the West;
35. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Ministers of Foreign Affairs
meeting in Political Cooperation and to the Council and the Commission.